Experiments with the pivot process for providing public goods

Public Choice

Volumn 102, Issue 1-2, 2000, Pages 95-114

  Attiyeh, Greg ^a   Franciosi, Robert ^b   Isaac, R Mark ^c  

^a Law and Economics Consulting Group   (United States)

^b Goldwater Institute   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034407233     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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