Agents with and without principals

American Economic Review

Volumn 90, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 203-208

  Bertrand, Marianne ^a   Mullainathan, Sendhil ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000953034     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.2.203     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Aggarwal, Rajesh and Samwick, Andrew. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation." Journal of Political Economy, February 1999, 107(1), pp. 65-105.
2. Bertrand, Marianne and Mullainathan, Sendhil. "Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation? Evidence from Takeover Legislation." Mimeo, Princeton University, 1999a.
3. _. "Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do." Mimeo, Princeton University, 1999b.
4. Crystal, Graef. In Search of excess: The Overcompensation of American executives. New York: Norton, 1991.
5. Holmstrom, Bengt. "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, 10(1), pp. 74-91.
6. Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control." Journal of Political Economy, June 1986, 94(3), pp. 461-88.