Auctions and efficiency

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume 1

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-24

  Maskin, Eric ^a  

^a INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84927966651     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511610240.002     Document Type: Chapter

References (28)

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