The biggest auction ever: The sale of the British 3G telecom licences

Economic Journal

Volumn 112, Issue 478, 2002, Pages C74-C96

  Binmore, Ken ^a   Klemperer, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

TELECOMMUNICATIONS;

EID: 0036222781     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00020     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. General equilibrium computations of the marginal welfare costs of taxes in the United States
2. Auctions vs. negotiations
3. The tobacco deal
4. Prices and the winner's curse
5. Toeholds and takeovers
6. The federal communications commission
7. Dissolving a partnership efficiently
8. Collusive bidding: Lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions
9. Tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax
10. An equilibrium theory of rationing
11. Strategic nonparticipation
12. How (not) to sell nuclear weapons
13. Auctions with almost common values
14. Auction theory: A guide to the literature
15. Why every economist should learn some auction theory
16. Spectrum on the block
17. How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions
18. What really matters in auction design
19. Analyzing the airwaves auction
20. Billions from auctions: Wishful thinking
21. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction
22. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding: II
23. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trade
24. Auctions markets and optimum allocations
25. Financial policy, internal control, and performance: Sealed Air Corporation's leveraged special dividend