Statutory interpretation by agencies

Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 285-332

  Stephenson, Matthew C ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890625573     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781849804899.00018     Document Type: Chapter

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