The unitary executive : Presidential power from Washington to Bush

The Unitary Executive : Presidential Power From Washington to Bush

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-544

  Calabresi, Steven G ^a   Yoo, Christopher S ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84902692086     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (550)

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183. Id. at 62, 74.
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194. 2 id. at 329, 342-44, 367, 495, 538-39, 541-43.
195. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 12, at 132.
196. U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
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204. Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 233-43 (1989).
205. Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional Interpretation in the First Year of Congress, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 79, 82-111 (1993).
206. 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 799-800, at 572 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray 1833).
207. James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, lecture 16, at 289-90 (New York, O. Halsted 1826).
208. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986).
209. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-75 (1926).
210. 11 Reg. Deb. 461 (1835).
211. 10 Reg. Deb. 1664, 1687-88 (1834).
212. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 110-33 (1926).
213. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
214. Rakove, supra note 2, at 250-53, 257-58.
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218. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 799-800, at 572 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray 1833).
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228. James Hart, The American Presidency in Action, 1789: A Study in Constitutional History 135 (1948).
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231. Hart, supra note 10, at 135.
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241. Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 240-42 (1989).
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243. Mashaw, supra note 7, at 1285-86, 1288, 1340.
244. Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, § 1, 1 Stat. 67, 67.
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495. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 949 (1980).
496. Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 401, 410-12 (1989).
497. Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 627, 628-34 (1989).
498. Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 596, 596-97 (1989).
499. Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A Firsthand Account 133 (1991).
500. Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 17, 38 (quoting William French Smith, Law and Justice in the Reagan Administration 222 (1991)).
501. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1245-46 (1994).
502. Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 Ky. L.J. 699, 770-76 (1987).
503. Independent Counsel Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 429-33 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 House Committee Hearings].
504. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 110-11 (1994).
505. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 615 (1984).
506. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 273, 286-90 (1993).
507. Louis Fisher, Separation of Power: Interpretation outside the Courts, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 57, 86 (1991).
508. Edwin Meese III, Address Before the Federal Bar Association Annual Banquet (Sept. 13, 1985), in 32 Fed. B. News & J. 406, 406-08 (1985).
509. Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
510. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1085 (1986).
511. Kenneth R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power 128 (2001).
512. C. Boyden Gray, Special Interest Regulation and the Separation of Powers, in The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch 221 (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989).
513. Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The NotSo-Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L.J. 963, 990-93 (2001).
514. Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1199, 1200-01 (1981).
515. Joseph Cooper & William F. West, Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules, 50 J. Pol. 874 (1988)).
516. David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1977, at 85-86 (2003).
517. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979 (1987).
518. Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush White House's Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1035, 1043 (1994).
519. Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 17 (detailing the Bush administration's efforts to defend presidential prerogatives).
520. Sharon LaFraniere, Barr Urges "Fundamental Changes" in Independent Counsel Statute, Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1992, at A5.
521. Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement 110, 115-16, 119, 129 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University), available at http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?miami1057716977.
522. David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1977, at 86 (2003).
523. David Kessler, A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle with a Deadly Industry 67, 70 (2001).
524. Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The NotSo-Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L.J. 963, 994-95 (2001).
525. Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 130, 141-42 (1992).
526. Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation outside the Courts, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 57, 86 (1990).
527. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 273, 288 (1993).
528. James Lindgren & Steven G. Calabresi, Rating the Presidents of the United States, 1789-2000: A Survey of Scholars in Political Science, History, and Law, 18 Const. Comm. 583, 591-92 (2001) (rating Clinton as the most controversial president in history).
529. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001).
530. Joe Klein, The Natural 3-4, 26 (2002).
531. Stanley A. Renshon, High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition 260 (1998) (citations omitted) (quoting Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency 99 (1994)).
532. R. W. Apple Jr., The Fallout of the Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1999, at A1 (quoting Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.).
533. Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two Impeachments, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 422, 426-31, 438-39, 443 (2000).
534. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 Geo. L.J. 1, 6 (2002).
535. Laura Kalman, The (Un?)Bearable Liteness of E-Mail: Historians, Impeachment, and Bush v. Gore, 4 Theoretical Inq. L. 579, 602 (2003) ("In fact, Clinton's impeachment bore few parallels to Johnson's.").
536. Reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Statute, Part I: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 27 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 House Subcommittee Hearings].
537. The Future of the Independent Counsel Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 242, 247-50 (1999).
538. Elizabeth Becker, Traces of Terror: Administration Insists on Control over New Agency's Labor Rules, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2002, at A20.
539. Dan Eggen & Mike Allen, Ashcroft Recuses Self from Leak Case: U.S. Attorney to Oversee Probe, Wash. Post, Dec. 31, 2003, at A1.
540. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or "the Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 732-38 (2007) (arguing that Executive Order 13422 increases presidential control over policymaking).,
541. The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 Yale J. on Reg. (forthcoming 2008).
542. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 110-11 (1994).
543. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 615 (1984).
544. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive during the First Half-Century, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1451, 1462 (1997).
545. Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography 352, 362 (1920) (1913).
546. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the Emergency Price Control Act (Jan. 30, 1942),.
547. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Asking for Quick Action to Stabilize the Economy (Sept. 7, 1942),.
548. Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon 57 (1999).
549. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 61-63 (1993).
550. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).