Comparable preference estimates across time and institutions for the court, congress, and presidency

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 433-448

  Bailey, Michael A ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250671418     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00260.x     Document Type: Article

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