Choosing strategies to control the bureaucracy: Statutory constraints, oversight, and the committee system

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 101-126

  Bawn, Kathleen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031518209     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023375     Document Type: Article

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