Overlapping and underlapping jurisdiction in administrative law

Supreme Court Review

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 201-247

  Gersen, Jacob E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 84858736953     PISSN: 00819557     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1086/655185     Document Type: Review

References (336)

1. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v United States, 276 US 394, 409 (1928). The vitality of the doctrine is hotly contested.
2. Compare Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U Chi L Rev 1721 (2002)
3. with Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U Chi L Rev 1297 (2003).
4. For the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the matter, see Whitman v American Trucking Association, 531 US 474 (2001).
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315, 321 (2000).
6. Consider FDAv Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 US 120, 161 (2000)
7. MCI Telecom Corp. v AT&T Corp., 512 US 218, 234 (1994).
8. See 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (2000)
9. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 US 29 (1983).
10. See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U Chi L Rev 1383, 1429-30 (2004)
11. Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 Duke L J 1051, 1065 (1995).
12. See also Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v Am. Electric Power Service Corp., 461 US 402, 412 n 7 (1983).
13. See 5 USC § 554(d) (2000).
14. Chevron USA, Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837 (1984).
15. For example, many commentators have urged that Chevron produces too much or too little deference. Compare Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum L Rev 452 (1989) (too low)
16. Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 Stan L Rev 1 (2000) (too low) (Pubitemid 33651494)
17. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev 2071 (1990) (too low)
18. with Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L J 1385 (1992) (too high)
19. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 Vand L Rev 301, 308-14 (1988) (too high)
20. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev 1093 (1987) (too high).
21. See, for example, Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363, 379 (1986).
22. Consider Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (Norton, 2d ed 1979)
23. Thomas O. Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 Am U L Rev 419, 424 (1987)
24. David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance? 83 Mich L Rev 1223, 1229 (1985).
25. But see Posner and Vermeule, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1729 (cited in note 1).
26. See, for example, Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Law, 116 Yale L J 1170 (2007)
27. Derek Jinks and Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1230 (2007).
28. 126 S Ct 904 (2006).
29. 21 USCA § 801 et seq (2006).
30. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or Rev Stat § 127.800 et seq (2003).
31. On Chevron and preemption, see generally Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich L Rev 740 (2004).
32. Or Rev Stat § 127.800 et seq (2003).
33. Or Rev Stat §§ 127.815, 127.800(12) (2003).
34. 84 Stat 1242 (1970), codified as amended 21 USCA § 801 et seq (2006).
35. 21 USCA §§ 841, 844 (2006).
36. 21 USC § 829(a) (2000).
37. 21 CFR § 1306.04(a) (2006).
38. Or Dept of Human Servs, Seventh Annual Report on Oregon's Death with Dignity Act 20 (Mar 10, 2005).
39. See Dan Eggen and Ceci Connolly, Ashcroft Ruling Blocks Ore. Assisted-Suicide Law, Wash Post A01 (Nov 7, 2001)
40. Joe Rojas-Burke, Showdown on Assisted Suicide Looms in Senate
41. Both Sides Know the Stakes Are High for the Right-to-Die Movement Across the Nation, Oregonian A01 (Sept 19, 2000)
42. Meddling with Oregon's Law, NY Times A14 (Oct 30, 1999).
43. Letter from Sen. Orrin Hatch and Rep. Henry Hyde to Thomas A. Constantine (July 25, 1997)
44. reprinted in Hearings on S 2151 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong, 2d Sess 2-3 (1999).
45. Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Sen. Orrin Hatch on Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (June 5, 1998)
46. reprinted in Hearings on S 2151 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong, 2d Sess 5-6 (1999).
47. See HR 4006, 105th Cong, 2d Sess, in 144 Cong Rec H 4240 (June 5, 1998)
48. HR 2260, 106th Cong, 1st Sess, in 145 Cong Rec H 4614 (June 17, 1999).
49. See Letter of Feb 2, 2001 in Brief for Patient-Respondents in Opposition, Appendix 55a, Gonzales v Oregon, 126 S Ct 904 (2006) (No 04-623).
50. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed Reg 56607 (Nov 9, 2001).
51. Oregon v Ashcroft, 192 F Supp 2d 1077, 1080 (D Or 2002).
52. Oregon v Ashcroft, 368 F3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir 2004).
53. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 925-26.
54. Chevron USA, Inc. v National Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837 (1984).
55. Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452 (1997)
56. Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 US 410, 414 (1945).
57. Gonzales, 126 S Ct 904, 914-17 (2006).
58. See also 21 USCA §§ 811, 823(q) (2006).
59. FTC v Ken Roberts Co., 276 F3d 583, 593 (DC Cir 2001)
60. quoting Thompson Medical Co. v FTC, 791 F2d 189, 192 (DC Cir 1986).
61. See also FTC v Texaco, Inc., 555 F2d 862, 881 (DC Cir 1976).
62. See generally FTC v Cement Institute, 333 US 683, 694-95 (1948).
63. See Part II.D.2.
64. See, for example, Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2097 (cited in note 6).
65. See, for example, FDAv Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 US 120 (2000)
66. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v Mississippi, 487 US 357 (1988)
67. United States v Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 US 121 (1985)
68. Massachusetts v EPA, 415 F3d 50 (DC Cir 2005), rev'd and remanded, 127 S Ct 1438 (2007)
69. United Transportation Union v Surface Transportation Board, 183 F3d 606 (7th Cir 1999)
70. Alaska v Babbitt, 72 F3d 698 (9th Cir 1995).
71. See generally David Epstein and Sharon O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: ATransaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (Cambridge, 1999).
72. See also Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency, 8 J L Econ & Org 111 (1992).
73. See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va L Rev 431 (1989).
74. See Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am J Pol Sci 165 (1984).
75. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U Chi L Rev 247 (2007).
76. See Michael M. Ting, The "Power of the Purse" and Its Implications for Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 106 Pub Choice 243 (2001).
77. See, for example, Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision-Making, 14 J L Econ & Org 114 (1998).
78. See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds, Can the Government Govern? 267 (Brookings, 1989).
79. See Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal L Rev 1655, 1704 (2006)
80. Michael M. Ting, AStrategic Theory of Bureacratic Redundancy, 47 Am J Pol Sci 274, 287 (2003).
81. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, J L Econ & Org (forthcoming 2007)
82. Jonathan Bendor and Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 Am Pol Sci Rev 293 (2004)
83. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J Pol Econ 1 (1997)
84. Kathleen Bawn, Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures, 89 Am Pol Sci Rev 62 (1995)
85. Steven Callander, ATheor y of Policy Expertise (unpublished manuscript, 2006), online at http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/Academic/workshops/pol-econ- papers/expertise5october2006.pdf
86. Sean Gailmard, Discretion Rather than Rules: Choice of Instruments to Constrain Bureaucratic Policy-Making (unpublished manuscript, August 2006), online at http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~spg763/menus.pdf.
87. For earlier and more general analysis, see McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 75 Va L Rev 431 (cited in note 41)
88. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J L Econ & Org 243 (1987).
89. See Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (Basic Books, 1989). Agencies might lose a sense of mission, or jurisdictional expansion might introduce additional opportunities for failure.
90. For a discussion of related issues deriving from the appropriate allocation of function to government agencies, see David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale L J 955 (2004).
91. See Joseph O'Connell, 94 Cal L Rev at 1704 (cited in note 47)
92. Ting, 47 Am J Pol Sci at 287 (cited in note 47)
93. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies 332 (Princeton, 1999)
94. Jean Tirole, The Internal Organization of Government, 46 Oxford Econ Papers 1 (1994).
95. See also Jonathan B. Bendor, Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government 244-45 (California 1985)
96. Dan S. Felsenthal and Eliezer Fuchs, Experimental Evaluation of Five Designs of Redundant Organizational Systems, 21 Admin Sci Q 474, 474 (1976)
97. Rowan Miranda and Allan Lerner, Bureaucracy, Organizational Redundancy, and the Privatization of Public Services, 55 Pub Admin Rev 193, 193 (1995).
98. See Andrew B. Whitford, Adapting Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment in the Design of Bureaucratic Performance, in George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier, eds, Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy 160 (Michigan, 2003)
99. Gary J. Miller and Terry M. Moe, Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government, 77 Am Pol Sci Rev 297, 310 (1983).
100. But seeWilliam A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J L & Econ 617 637 (1975) (competition decreases cost of monitoring).
101. 21 USC § 811(a) (2000 & Supp 2004).
102. See, for example, 21 USC § 811(d)(3)(C) (2000 & Supp 2004) (requiring the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services to coordinate drug scheduling).
103. 21 USC § 821 (2000 & Supp 2004).
104. 21 USC §§ 822, 871 (2000).
105. 21 USC § 903 (2000) ("No provision of this title shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this title and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.").
106. Chevron, 467 US at 842.
107. There are many subtle problems about Step One that I do not attempt to review here. For a comprehensive treatment, see Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in John F. Duffy and Michael Herz, eds, AGuide to Judicial and Political Review of Federal Agencies (ABA, 2005).
108. See Chevron USA, Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 845 (1984).
109. For an overview, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187 (2006).
110. 529 US 576 (2000).
111. 533 US 218 (2001).
112. 535 US 212 (2002).
113. The term is originally from Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo L J 833, 872 (2001).
114. Chevron, 467 US at 865.
115. Mead, 533 US at 230 n 11
116. citing Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J (cited in note 65).
117. See 5 USC § 706 (2000) ("To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law.").
118. Mead, 533 US at 226.
119. See Shalala v Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 US 1, 20-21 (2000)
120. United States v Haggar Apparel Co., 526 US 380 (1999)
121. AT&T Corp. v Iowa Utilities Board, 525 US 366 (1999)
122. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v Commissioner, 523 US 382 (1998)
123. Regions Hospital v Shalala, 522 US 448 (1998)
124. United States v O'Hagan, 521 US 642 (1997)
125. Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 US 735 (1996)
126. Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Greater Ore., 515 US 687 (1995)
127. ICC v Transcon Lines, 513 US 138 (1995)
128. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson City v Washington Department of Ecology, 511 US 700 (1994)
129. Good Samaritan Hospital v Shalala, 508 US 402 (1993)
130. American Hospital Association v NLRB, 499 US 606 (1991)
131. Sullivan v Everhart, 494 US 83 (1990)
132. Sullivan v Zebley, 493 US 521 (1990)
133. Massachusetts v Morash, 490 US 107 (1989)
134. K Mart Corp. v Cartier, Inc., 486 US 281 (1988)
135. Atkins v Rivera, 477 US 154 (1986)
136. United States v Fulton, 475 US 657 (1986)
137. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 US 121.
138. See Mead, 533 US at 231.
139. See National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v Brand X Internet Servs., 545 US 967, 1003-05 (2005) (Breyer, J, concurring).
140. 535 US 212 (2002).
141. See Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 217 (cited in note 61) (discussing the passage and opinion).
142. Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 379 (cited in note 7).
143. Compare David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Supreme Court Review 201, 227
144. with Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo Wash U L Rev 347 (2003)
145. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand L Rev 1443, 1457 (2005).
146. See Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J at 851 (cited in note 65).
147. See also Sutton v United Airlines, 527 US 471, 478-80 (1999)
148. Bragdon v Abbott, 524 US 624, 642 (1998).
149. See New Haven Board of Education v Bell, 456 US 512, 522 n 12 (1982)
150. General Electric Co. v Gilbert, 429 US 125, 144-45 (1977).
151. See, for example, Daniel Lovejoy, Note, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference: Multiple-Agency Statutes, 88 Va L Rev 879 (2002).
152. Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J at 893 (cited in note 65).
153. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v Rambo, 521 US 121, 137 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
154. See also Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J at 893 n 288 (cited in note 65).
155. See, for example, DuBois v United States Department of Agriculture, 102 F3d 1273, 1285 n 15 (1st Cir 1996) (declining to apply Chevron to NEPA "because we [the court] are not reviewing an agency's interpretation of the statute that it was directed to enforce").
156. for Freedom of the Press v United States Dept. of Justice, 816 F2d 730, 734 (DC Cir 1987)
157. ("[N]o one executive branch entity is entrusted with [FOIA's] primary interpretation"), revd on other grounds, 489 US 749 (1989).
158. 939 F2d 1047 (DC Cir 1991).
159. See Adams Fruit Co. v Barrett, 494 US 638 (1990) (stating that Chevron deference to an agency interpretation of a statute the agency did not administer would be inappropriate)
160. Crandon v United States, 494 US 152 (1990) (Scalia, J, concurring) (rejecting Chevron deference because the statute in question was not administered by any agency but by the courts).
161. 476 US 610 (1986).
162. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-113, 87 Stat 394
163. codified as amended at 29 USC § 794 (1986).
164. See also Bowen, 476 US at 642.
165. 527 US 471 (1999).
166. See also Get Oil Out! Inc. v Exxon Corp., 586 F2d 726 (9th Cir 1978).
167. 499 US 144 (1991).
168. See generally Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 Ala L Rev 35 (1991)
169. George Robert Johnson, The Split Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHAand MSHAExperiences , 39 Admin L Rev 315 (1987).
170. Martin, 499 US at 150.
171. 484 US 495 (1988).
172. See also Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 Cornell J L & Pub Policy 203 246-47 (2004).
173. Pub L No 78-534, 58 Stat 887
174. codified as amended at 33 USC § 701 et seq (2000).
175. See ETSI, 484 US at 502-05.
176. See 58 Stat at 890, 903-07.
177. 107Weaver refers to a similar idea as "authority principles." See Weaver, 43 Ala L Rev at 38 (cited in note 98).
178. This practice is not universal. Some courts grappling with potentially overlapping jurisdiction schemes have asserted that "when two regulatory systems are applicable to a certain subject matter, they are to be reconciled and, to the extent possible, both given effect," Pennsylvania v ICC, 561 F2d 278, 292 (DC Cir 1977)
179. at least where they do not create "conflicting or incompatible obligations." Ken Roberts Co., 276 F3d at 593.
180. See Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 245 n 245 (cited in note 61).
181. See, for example, Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 937 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
182. See Martin, 499 US at 153.
183. See generally Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev 315 (cited in note 2).
184. See, for example, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 US 568, 574-75 (1988)
185. Chamber of Commerce v FEC, 69 F3d 600, 605 (DC Cir 1995).
186. See Mendelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 746-47 (cited in note 13)
187. Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev 2071 (cited in note 6).
188. Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 243-44 (cited in note 61) (discussing the possibility of reading MCI and Brown & Williamson as Step Zero cases, but ultimately concluding they are best read as Step One cases).
189. See Walton, 536 US 212
190. Mead, 533 US 218
191. Christensen, 529 US 576.
192. Compare Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J at 893-99 (cited in note 65).
193. See Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J at 895 (cited in note 65).
194. This disagreement aside, it seems clear that the lower courts have trended away from this preferred position. For example, in Rapaport v Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 F3d 212 (DC Cir 1995), the D.C. Circuit refused to give deference to a statutory interpretation by the Office of Thrift Supervision because "that agency [OTS] shares responsibility for the administration of the statute with at least three other agencies."
195. The Court relied on Wachtel v Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F2d 581 (DC Cir 1993), where the court, in dicta, suggested deference might not apply in such settings.
196. Wachtel, in turn, relied on Professional Reactor Operator Society, 939 F2d 1047.
197. citing Chevron, 467 US 837
198. Adams Fruit Co., 494 US 638
199. Crandon, 494 US 152 (Scalia, J, concurring).
200. See Rapaport, 59 F3d at 216-17.
201. See Environmental Defense v Duke Energy Corp., 127 S Ct 1423 (2007)
202. K Mart, 486 US at 293 n 4.
203. See, for example, Chevron, 467 US 837.
204. See Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J at 894-95 (cited in note 65).
205. 545 US 967 (2005).
206. For a proposal to address sequencing problems like this, see generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 NYU L Rev 1272 (2002).
207. Brand X, 545 US at 982.
208. See also Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J at 894-95 (cited in note 65).
209. For general treatments, see Mendelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 740 (cited in note 13)
210. Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power, 110 Yale L J 1187 (2001)
211. Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev 315 (cited in note 2)
212. JackW. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U Pitt L Rev 805 (1998)
213. Damien Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 Geo L J 263 (1998) (Pubitemid 128426747)
214. Howard P. Walthall, Jr., Comment, Chevron v. Federalism: AReassessment of Deference to Administrative Preemption, 28 Cumb L Rev 715 (1997)
215. Paula A. Sinozich et al, The Role of Preemption in Administrative Law, 45 Admin L Rev 107 (1993)
216. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law, 46 U Pitt L Rev 607 (1985).
217. See, for example, Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va L Rev 225 (2000)
218. Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo L J 2085 (2000)
219. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 Mich L Rev 813 (1998).
220. Consider Nelson, 86 Va L Rev 225 (cited in note 135).
221. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v Paul, 373 US 132, 142-43 (1963).
222. Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941).
223. Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr, 518 US 470, 508 (1996) (Breyer, J, concurring in part)
224. quoting Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 US 218, 230 (1947).
225. 331 US 218 (1947).
226. See Medtronic, 518 US at 485.
227. See, for example, Geier v American Honda Motor Co., 529 US 861 (2000)
228. Norfolk Southern Railway v Shanklin, 529 US 347 (2000)
229. United States v Locke, 529 US 89 (2000)
230. Smiley, 517 US 735
231. Medtronic, 518 US 470
232. City of New York v FCC, 486 US 57 (1988).
233. See generally Richard Pierce, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 3.5 (Aspen, 4th ed 2002).
234. See Mendelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 738 (cited in note 13).
235. When a federal agency acts within the scope of delegated power it can preempt state and local regulations. City of New York, 486 US at 64.
236. 2007 WL 1119539 (US April 17, 2007).
237. 517 US 735 (1996).
238. In the lower courts, Chevron deference is sometimes applied, see, for example, Center for Legal Advocacy v Hammons, 323 F3d 1262 (9th Cir 2003) (applying Chevron framework, but rejecting agency view), and sometimes not
239. see, for example, Massachusetts Association of HMOs v Ruthardt, 194 F3d 176 (1st Cir 1999) (independent evaluation of statute's effect).
240. 518 US 470.
241. See also Smiley, 517 US at 739-41
242. Lawrence County v Lead-Deadwood School District No. 40-1, 469 US 256, 261-62 (1985) (substantially deferring to Interior Department finding of preemption of state law)
243. Hillsborough County v Automated Medical Labs, Inc., 471 US 707, 714 (1985) ("The FDA's statement is dispositive on the question of implicit intent to pre-empt unless either the agency's position is inconsistent with clearly expressed congressional intent.").
244. See Medtronic, 518 US at 512 (O'Connor, J, dissenting in part) ("Apparently recognizing that Chevron deference is unwarranted here, the Court does not admit to deferring to these regulations, but merely permits them to 'inform' the Court's interpretation.").
245. Consider Geier, 529 US at 883 ("We place some weight upon DOT's interpretation of [the statute's] objectives and its conclusion, as set forth in the Government's brief, that a tort suit such as this one would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of those objectives.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
246. United States v Shimer, 367 US 374, 382 (1961).
247. See also City of New York, 486 US at 64.
248. See generally Paul A. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron? Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 Case W Res L Rev 863, 866 (1995).
249. Compare Mendelson, 102 Mich L Rev 740 (cited in note 13) (no deference)
250. Dinh, 88 Geo L J at 2087 (cited in note 135) (same)
251. Campbell, 59 U Pitt L Rev at 832 (cited in note 135) (no deference)
252. with Pierce, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 3.5 (cited in note 143) (yes deference)
253. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex L Rev 1321, 1425 (2001) (deference to agencies' finding of preemption threatens federalism)
254. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 BU L Rev 685 (1991) (criticizing deference to agencies' findings of preemption as threat to meaningful local governance)
255. Marshall, 87 Geo L J 263 (cited in note 135) (deference inappropriate because agencies lack political accountability).
256. See, for example, Campbell, 59 U Pitt L Rev at 832 (cited in note 135).
257. See also Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 331 (cited in note 2).
258. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543 (1954).
259. Mendelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 741-42 (cited in note 13). Mendelson also argues that giving deference to agency views on preemption might result in inadequately constrained decision-making processes.
260. See Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J 833 at 844 n 54 (cited in note 65)
261. Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2097 (cited in note 6).
262. See Dole v United Steelworkers, 494 US 26, 43 (1990) (White, J, dissenting)
263. Social Security Board v Nieretko, 327 US 358, 369 (1946) ("An agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory power.").
264. See Mississippi Power & Light Co., 487 US at 381-82 (1988) (Scalia, J, concurring).
265. Compare Air Courier v United States Postal Service, 959 F2d 1223, 1225 (3d Cir 1992) (Becker, J, concurring) (deference to jurisdictional questions should be limited)
266. With Oklahoma National Gas Co. v FERC, 28 F3d 1281, 1283-84 (DC Cir 1994) (deference to jurisdictional judgments appropriate).
267. Collins v NTSB, 351 F3d 1246, 1252-53 (DC Cir 2003) (no deference to jurisdictional determination when statute is implemented by multiple agencies)
268. Rapaport, 59 F3d at 216 (same)
269. Wachtel, 982 F2d at 585 (same)
270. ACLU v FCC, 823 F2d 1554, 1567 n 32 (DC Cir 1987) ("highly unlikely that a responsible Congress would implicitly delegate to an agency the power to define the scope of its own power.").
271. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 487 US at 386.
272. See Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo L J at 910 (cited in note 65)
273. Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2099 (cited in note 6) ("Because congressional instructions are crucial here, courts should probably refuse to defer to agency decisions with respect to issues of jurisdiction-again, if we assume that the distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions is easily administrable.").
274. See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2097 (cited in note 6).
275. See generally Armstrong, 13 Cornell J L & Pub Policy 203 (cited in note 102).
276. See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2100-2101 (cited in note 6).
277. See also Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations That Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U Chi L Rev 957, 969-70 (1994).
278. See, for example,William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government 36-42 (Aldine, Atherton, 1971).
279. See also Wilson, Bureaucracy at 118-19 (cited in note 49)
280. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy 26 (Little, Brown, 1989).
281. In practice, it may be exceedingly difficult to distinguish these two factors. For example, was the EPA's decision not to regulate greenhouse gases during the second Bush administration a function of politics, expertise, or both? See Massachusetts v EPA, 126 S Ct 1438 (2007).
282. See also Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv L Rev 915, 935 (2006).
283. see Walthall, 28 Cumb L Rev at 754-58 (cited in note 135).
284. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va L Rev 1 (1950).
285. See generally Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 26 (Oxford, 1995)
286. Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Role of the Court, in Valerie A. Earle, ed, Federalism: Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice 8, 24-25 (F. E. Peacock, 1968).
287. For an overview and discussion in the context of foreign affairs, see Ernest Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 Geo Wash L Rev 139, 143 (2001).
288. See also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand L Rev 1485 (1994). (Pubitemid 24834100)
289. See Young, 69 Geo Wash L Rev at 143-45 (cited in note 177).
290. 21 CFR § 1306.04(a), 36 Fed Reg 7799 (Apr 24, 1971)
291. redesignated at 38 Fed Reg 26609 (Sept 24, 1973)
292. amended at 39 Fed Reg 37986 (Oct 25, 1974).
293. 21 CFR § 1306.04.
294. 66 Fed Reg 56607 (Nov 9, 2001).
295. Gonzales v Oregon, 126 S Ct 904, 926 (2006) (Scalia, J, dissenting).
296. Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452, 461 (1997).
297. See also Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 US 410, 414 (1945).
298. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 915.
299. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 916 (emphasis added).
300. See also National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v Brand X Internet Servs., 545 US 967, 980 (2004) (finding Chevron deference appropriate to an FCC regulation because Congress delegated authority to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of the Act)
301. Household Credit Services, Inc. v Pfennig, 541 US 232, 238 (2004) (deferring under Chevron doctrine to Federal Reserve board regulation because Congress delegated authority to make regulations as necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of the statute).
302. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 917.
303. For example, section 821 gives the Attorney General authority "to promulgate rules and regulations and to charge reasonable fees relating to the registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances and to listed chemicals." 21 USC § 821 (2006) (emphasis added).
304. Section 871(b) gives the Attorney General authority "to promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures which he may deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient execution of his functions under this subchapter." 21 USC § 871(b) (2006).
305. See 21 USC § 802(5) (2006).
306. To exercise this scheduling authority the Attorney General must follow a set of procedures that include requesting a scientific and medical evaluation from the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 21 USC § 811 (2006).
307. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 929.
308. See 21 USC § 823(f) (2006)
309. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 918.
310. 21 USC § 841 (2006).
311. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 918.
312. Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 243-44 (cited in note 61).
313. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 917
314. Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1253 (1970)
315. codified at 21 USC § 301 et seq (1976).
316. After the 1984 Amendments, the Attorney General could also deny or revoke registration if such registration is found to be "inconsistent with the public interest." 21 USC §§ 823(f), 824(a) (2006).
317. See Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 918, citing Federal Maritime Commission v Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 US 726, 744 (1973).
318. See Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 921-22.
319. Chevron USA, Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 844 (1984).
320. Justice Scalia reasoned that because § 821 gives the Attorney General authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the registration and control of the manufacturing, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances, the statute should be read to delegate interpretive authority to the Attorney General for all of Part C of the CSA, §§ 821-30. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 936-37 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
321. The Court relied on Sutton v United Air Lines, 527 US 471 (1999).
322. see 527 US at 514 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
323. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 919.
324. quoting Martin v Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 499 US 144, 153 (1991).
325. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 925 (internal citations omitted).
326. See Rush Prudential, HMO, Inc. v Moran, 536 US 355, 387 (2002).
327. See United States v Bass, 404 US 336, 349 (1971).
328. See Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 925.
329. See generally Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 13 (2006).
330. See Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 922.
331. See, for example, 21 USC § 823(f) (2006) (making compliance with the laws of the state in which the potential registrant practices necessary to dispense controlled substances).
332. See also 21 USC § 802(21) (2006).
333. See 21 USC § 903 (2006).
334. See Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 923.
335. See also Hillsborough County v Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 US 707, 717 (1985).
336. Gonzales, 126 S Ct at 924.