Who controls the bureaucracy?: Presidential power, congressional dominance, legal constraints, and bureaucratic autonomy in a model of multi-institutional policy-making

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 119-166

  Hammond, Thomas H ^a   Knott, Jack H ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030533719     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023355     Document Type: Article

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