Comparing presidents, senators, and justices: Interinstitutional preference estimation

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 477-506

  Bailey, Michael ^a   Chang, Kelly H ^b,c  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035640671     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/17.2.477     Document Type: Review

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