The "Power of the purse" and its implications for bureaucratic policy-making

Public Choice

Volumn 106, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 243-274

  Ting, Michael M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035583361     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005288927750     Document Type: Article

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