Discretion rather than rules: Choice of instruments to control bureaucratic policy making

Political Analysis

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 25-44

  Gailmard, Sean ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62549133585     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpn011     Document Type: Article

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