Spatial models of delegation

American Political Science Review

Volumn 98, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 293-310

  Bendor, Jonathan ^a,c   Meirowitz, Adam ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042728591     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055404001157     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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