Political accountability under alternative institutional regimes

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 139-167

  Stephenson, Matthew C ^a   Nzelibe, Jide O ^b  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

Electoral accountability; Formal theory; Separation of powers

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952990196     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629809359037     Document Type: Article

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