Bureaucratic decision costs and endogenous agency expertise

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 469-498

  Stephenson, Matthew C ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547431787     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm030     Document Type: Article

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