The American system of shared powers: The president, congress, and the NLRB

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 269-305

  Snyder, Susan K ^a   Weingast, Barry R ^b  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034357281     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/16.2.269     Document Type: Article

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