The politics of Supreme Court nominations: A theory of institutional constraints and choices

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 1069-1095

  Moraski, Bryon J ^a   Shipan, Charles R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033247013     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2991818     Document Type: Article

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