Separation of powers and appointee ideology

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 438-457

  Nixon, David C ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4544347155     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewh041     Document Type: Article

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