Does Delaware law improve firm value?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 62, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 525-558

  Daines, Robert ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; G30; G34; Investor protection; K22; Law

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000544450     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00086-1     Document Type: Article

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