Firms' decisions where to incorporate

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 383-425

  Bebchuk, Lucian Arye ^a   Cohen, Alma ^b  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1342268967     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/378574     Document Type: Review

References (46)

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