The myth of diffuse ownership in the United States

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1377-1408

  Holderness, Clifford G ^a  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62649100968     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm069     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. Anderson, R. C, and D. S. Lee. 1997. Ownership Studies: The Data Source Does Matter. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32:311-30.
2. Anderson, R. C, and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58:1301-28.
3. Bebchuk, L. A. 1994. Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:957-94.
4. Becht, M. 2001. Beneficial Ownership in the United States, in M. Becht and C. P. Mayer (eds.), The Control of Corporate Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Becht, M., and B. DeLong. 2005. Why Has There Been So Little Blockholding in America? in R. K. Morck (ed.),Λ History of Corporate Governance Around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers. Chicago: NBER, University of Chicago Press.
6. Beny, L. N. 2005. Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence. American Law and Economics Review 7:144-83.
7. Berle, A. A., Jr., and G. C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan.
8. Bloch, L., and E. Kremp. 1999. Ownership and Voting Power in France. Working Paper, INSEE, Paris, France.
9. Burkart, M., D. Gromb, and F. Panunzi. 1997. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and Fiduciary Duty. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:693-728.
10. Burkart, M., D. Gromb, and F. Panunzi. 1998. Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders. Journal of Political Economy 106:172-204.
11. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58:81-112.
12. Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93:1155-77.
13. Denis, D. K., and J. J. McConnell. 2003. International Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38:1-36.
14. Dlugosz, J., R. Fahlenbrach, P. A. Gompers, and A. Metrick. 2006. Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement. Journal of Corporate Finance 12:594-618.
15. Durnev, A., and E. H. Kim. 2005. To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation. Journal of Finance 60:1461-93.
16. Eisenberg, M. A. 1976. The Structure of the Corporation. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
17. Faccio, M., and L. H. P. Lang. 2002. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Countries. Journal of Financial Economics 65:365-95.
18. Franks, J., C. P. Mayer, and S. Rossi. 2007. Ownership: Evolution and Regulation. Working Paper, London Business School.
19. Freedman, D. A. 2004. Ecological Inferences and the Ecological Fallacy. In International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, pp. 4027-30.
20. Freedman, D. A., R. Pisani, and R. Purves. 2007. Statistics (4th ed.). New York: W.W. Norton.
21. Gilson, S. C. 1990. Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default. Journal of Financial Economics 26:355-87.
22. Greenland, S., and J. Robins. 1994. Invited Commentary: Ecological Studies-Biases, Misconceptions, and Counterexamples. American Journal of Epidemiology 139:747-60.
23. Grossman, S., and O. Hart. 1988. One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics 20:175-202.
24. Harris, M., and A. Raviv. 1988. Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules. Journal of Financial Economics 20:203-35.
25. Helwege, J., C. Pirinsky, and R. M. Stulz. 2007. Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership. Journal of Finance 62:995-1028.
26. Herman, E. S. 1981. Corporate Control, Corporate Power. New York: Cambridge University Press.
27. Himmelberg, C. P., R. G. Hubbard, and D. Palia. 1999. Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link between Ownership and Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 53:353-84.
28. Holderness, C. G. 2003. Joint Ownership and Alienability. International Review of Law and Economics 23:75100.
29. Holderness, C. G. 2007. Do Differences in Legal Protections Explain Differences in Ownership Concentration? Working Paper, Boston College.
30. Holderness, C. G., R. S. Kroszner, and D. P. Sheehan. 1999. Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression. Journal of Finance 54:435-69.
31. Holderness, C. G., and D. P. Sheehan. 1985. Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors. Journal of Financial Economics 14:555-79.
32. Holderness, C. G., and D. P. Sheehan. 1988. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 20:317-6.
33. Kato, H. K., M. Lemmon, M. Luo, and J. Schallheim. 2005. An Empirical Examination of the Costs and Benefits of Executive Stock Options: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 78:435-61.
34. Kole, S., and K. Lehn. 1999. Deregulation and the Adaptation of Governance Structures: The Case of the U.S. Airline Industry. Journal of Financial Economics 52:79-118.
35. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance 54:471-517.
36. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2006. What Works in Securities Laws? Journal of Finance 61:1-32.
37. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 106:1113-55.
38. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. Journal of Finance 57:1113-55.
39. Lins, K. V 2003. Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38:159-84.
40. McConnell, J., and H. Servaes. 1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value. Journal of Financial Economics 27:595-612.
41. Mikkelson, W. H., and M. Partch. 1989. Managers' Voting Rights and Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics 25:263-90.
42. Mikkelson, W. H., and R. S. Ruback. 1985. An Empirical Analysis of the Inter-Firm Equity Investment Process. Journal of Financial Economics 14:523-53.
43. Miwa, Y., and J. M. Ramseyer. 2002. The Fable of the Keiretsu. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 11:169-224.
44. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20:293-315.
45. Perez-Gonzalez, F. 2003. Large Shareholders and Dividends: Evidence from U.S. Tax Reforms. Working Paper, University of Texas, Austin.
46. Roe, M. J. 1997. The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9:8-22.
47. Roe, M. J. 2005. The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance. The Corporate Governance Law Review 1:1-19.
48. Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy 94:461-88.
49. Stulz, R. M. 2005. The Limits of Financial Globalization. Journal of Finance 60:1595-638.
50. Tirole, J. 2006. The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
51. Villalonga, B., and R. Amit. 2006. How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value? Journal of Financial Economics 80:385-17.