Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence

Journal of Finance

Volumn 58, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 1997-2032

  Gillette, Ann B ^a   Noe, Thomas H ^b   Rebello, Michael J ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142250335     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00595     Document Type: Review

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