Corporate governance and acquirer returns

Journal of Finance

Volumn 62, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1851-1889

  Masulis, Ronald W ^a   Wang, Cong ^b   Xie, Fei ^c  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b The Chinese University of Hong Kong

^c GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547880030     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x     Document Type: Article

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