CEO contracting and antitakeover amendments

Journal of Finance

Volumn 52, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 1495-1517

  Borokhovich, Kenneth A ^b   Brunarski, Kelly R ^c   Parrino, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041049076     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01118.x     Document Type: Article

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