Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 195-218

  Cotter, James F ^a   Shivdasani, Anil ^b   Zenner, Marc ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Board monitoring; Board of directors; Corporate governance; Takeovers; Tender offers

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031066545     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(96)00886-0     Document Type: Article

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