The economics of fraudulent accounting

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 2169-2199

  Kedia, Simi ^a   Philippon, Thomas ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 59049088346     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm016     Document Type: Article

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