Corporate ownership around the world

Journal of Finance

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 471-517

  La Porta, Rafael ^a   Lopez de Silanes, Florencio ^a   Shleifer, Andrei ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006761611     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00115     Document Type: Article

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