Option backdating and board interlocks

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 11, 2009, Pages 4821-4847

  Bizjak, John ^a   Lemmon, Michael ^b   Whitby, Ryan ^c  

^a PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^c TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 71949103085     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn120     Document Type: Article

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