Chapter 25 Economic analysis of law

Handbook of Public Economics

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 1661-1784

  Kaplow, Louis ^a   Shavell, Steven ^a  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

accident(s); alternative dispute resolution; appeal(s); causation; contract(s); copyright; court(s); crime; damage(s); disclosure; externalities; fine(s); firm(s); imprisonment; insurance; intellectual property; intentional tort(s); judge(s); law economics; law enforcement; lawyer(s); legal procedure; liability; litigation; patent; plea bargaining; product liability; property; property right(s); public property; regulation; settlement; suit; takings; tort(s); trade secret; trademark; trial

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649383131     PISSN: 15734420     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80029-5     Document Type: Chapter

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