The litigious plaintiff hypothesis: Case selection and resolution

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 28, Issue , 1997, Pages

  Eisenberg, Theodore ^a   Farber, Henry S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031495701     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3087457     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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