메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 183-196

Optimal law enforcement with dissemination of information

Author keywords

Economics of crime; Optimal sanction; Probability of apprehension

Indexed keywords


EID: 0141539096     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008738128742     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)

References (13)
  • 1
    • 0000612302 scopus 로고
    • Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension
    • Bebchuk, L.A. and L. Kaplow. (1992). "Optimal Sanctions when Individuals are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension." Journal of Legal Studies. 21, 365-370.
    • (1992) Journal of Legal Studies , vol.21 , pp. 365-370
    • Bebchuk, L.A.1    Kaplow, L.2
  • 2
    • 0000787258 scopus 로고
    • Crime and punishment: An economic approach
    • Becker, G.S. (1968). "Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach." Journal of Political Economy. 76, 169-217.
    • (1968) Journal of Political Economy , vol.76 , pp. 169-217
    • Becker, G.S.1
  • 3
    • 0031232050 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Playing without a rulebook: Optimal enforcement when individuals learn the penalty only by committing a crime
    • Ben-Shahar, O. (1997). "Playing Without a Rulebook: Optimal Enforcement when Individuals Learn the Penalty Only by Committing a Crime." International Review of Law and Economics. 17, 409-421.
    • (1997) International Review of Law and Economics , vol.17 , pp. 409-421
    • Ben-Shahar, O.1
  • 4
    • 0041862208 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Normative failure theory of law
    • Cooter, R. (1997). "Normative Failure Theory of Law," Cornell Law Review. 82, 947-979.
    • (1997) Cornell Law Review , vol.82 , pp. 947-979
    • Cooter, R.1
  • 6
    • 0012385754 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The theory of optimal law enforcement
    • Garoupa, N. (1997). "The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement." Journal of Economic Surveys 11, 267-295.
    • (1997) Journal of Economic Surveys , vol.11 , pp. 267-295
    • Garoupa, N.1
  • 7
    • 0001942004 scopus 로고
    • Optimal deterrence, uninformed individuals and acquiring information about whether acts are subject to sanctions
    • Kaplow, L. (1990). "Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals and Acquiring Information about whether Acts are Subject to Sanctions." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 6, 93-128.
    • (1990) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization , vol.6 , pp. 93-128
    • Kaplow, L.1
  • 9
    • 0000201195 scopus 로고
    • Avoidance, screening and optimum enforcement
    • Malik, A.S. (1990). "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement." Rand Journal of Economics 21, 341-353.
    • (1990) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.21 , pp. 341-353
    • Malik, A.S.1
  • 10
    • 84980210190 scopus 로고
    • The economics of crime and the sociology of deviant behaviour: A theoretical confrontation of basic propositions
    • Opp, K.-D. (1989). "The Economics of Crime and the Sociology of Deviant Behaviour: a Theoretical Confrontation of Basic Propositions." Kylos. 42, 405-430.
    • (1989) Kylos , vol.42 , pp. 405-430
    • Opp, K.-D.1
  • 11
  • 12
    • 84935436950 scopus 로고
    • Social osmosis and patterns of crime
    • Sah, R. K. (1991). "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime." Journal of Political Economy. 99, 1272-1295.
    • (1991) Journal of Political Economy , vol.99 , pp. 1272-1295
    • Sah, R.K.1
  • 13
    • 0347640452 scopus 로고
    • Legal advice about contemplated acts: The decision to obtain advice, its desirability and protection of confidentiality
    • Shavell, S. (1988). "Legal Advice about Contemplated Acts: The Decision To Obtain Advice, its Desirability and Protection of Confidentiality." Journal of Legal Studies. 17, 123-150.
    • (1988) Journal of Legal Studies , vol.17 , pp. 123-150
    • Shavell, S.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.