Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment

American Economic Review

Volumn 86, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 478-501

  Edlin, Aaron S ^a   Reichelstein, Stefan ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000270253     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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