Lender liability for environmental harm: An argument against negligence based rules

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 231-250

  Feess, Eberhard ^a  

^a GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Lender liability; Limited liability effect; Monitoring; Vague negligence rule

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344375212     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008799526682     Document Type: Article

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