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Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 21-33

Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort

Author keywords

Contingent fees; Expert services; Incentives; Litigation

Indexed keywords


EID: 0041411787     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00019-3     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (45)

References (16)
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  • 10
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    • Do contingent fees promote excessive litigation?
    • Miceli T.J. Do contingent fees promote excessive litigation? J Legal Studies. 23:1994;211-224.
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  • 12
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    • Some agency problems in settlement
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  • 15
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  • 16
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    • An economic analysis of the contingent fee in personal injury litigation
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.