Experimental results on bargaining under alternative property rights regimes

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 50-73

  Croson, Rachel ^a,b   Johnston, Jason Scott ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

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EID: 0034397346     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Such a regime represents the reduced form of the "property rights" regime introduced by Calabresi and Melamed (1972), in that the right to an injunction is in effect the right to impose a severe contempt sanction on any actor who takes without consent.
2. This result hinges on the assumption that there is no private cost when capture is unsuccessful.
3. h) = (8/3)(3 - 5/6 - 31/36) = 376/108. As can be seen, the return from the strategy of bargaining-in-the-shadow of a credible taking threat is higher than the return from an immediate taking, given the parameters used. As can also be verified, taking after rejection by only the h type is indeed credible in period 2, since (5/36)8 > F = .5.
4. Card game implementation of experiments has been used previously, and is thought to induce more competitive behavior than other implementations [see, e.g., Andreoni and Varian (1993)].
5. In this algorithm, subjects are arranged in pairs and ordered. For example, imagine that there are 20 subjects arranged in 10 pairs. Call the subjects in pair 1, 1a and 1b, in pair 2, 2a and 2b, and so on through 10a and 10b. After each round, all b players shift one to the left, so the new pairings in round two are 1a-2b, 2a-3b,..., 10a-1b. In round three, the pairings are 1a-3b, 2a-4b,..., 10a-2b. This algorithm guarantees not only that subjects never meet the same opponent more than once (as a random pairing algorithm would not guarantee), but also that no subject plays against a subject who has played against someone who has played against him (contamination effects).
6. i = 34, 36, 30, and 144) for the four treatments, respectively.
7. See Penn Central Transportation v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Although Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) is often taken as eliminating such balancing, this is true only when the regulation wipes out all economically viable use of the private property, or at least Lucas has been so interpreted by a number of courts [see, e.g., K & K Construction Inc. v. DNR, NW2d (Mich. 1998)].
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