Plea bargaining and deterrence: An institutional approach

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 249-264

  Miceli, Thomas J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Economics of crime; Plea bargaining

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040639298     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00709142     Document Type: Article

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