The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 112, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 1127-1161

  Hart, Oliver ^a   Shleifer, Andrei ^a   Vishny, Robert W ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012006828     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355300555448     Document Type: Article

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