Punishing repeat offenders more severely

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 127-140

  Chu, C Y Cyrus ^a   Hu, Sheng Cheng ^a   Huang, Ting Yuan ^b  

^a INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS   (Taiwan)

^b ACADEMIA SINICA   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007292661     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00024-7     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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4. Polinsky A.M., Rubinfeld D.L. A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders. J Public Econ. 46:1991;291-306.
5. Polinsky, A.M. & Shavell, S. (1996). Repeat offenders and the theory of deterrence. Harvard Law School Discussion Paper No. 188.
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7. Posner R.A. Economic Analysis of Law. 1992;Little, Brown and Company, Boston.
8. Png I.P.L. Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error. Int Rev Law Econ. 6:1986;101-105.
9. Rubinstein A. An optimal conviction policy for offenses that may have been committed by accident. Brams S.J., Schotter A., Schwodiauer G. Applied Game Theory. 1979;406-413 Physica-Verlag, Wurzburg, Germany.
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11. Stigler G.J. The optimum enforcement of laws. J Polit Economy. 78:1970;526-536.