A Model of Efficient Discovery

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 219-250

  Mnookin, Robert ^a   Wilson, Robert ^b  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002133627     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0632     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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5. Fudenberg D., Tirole J. Dynamic Models of Oligopoly. 1986;Harwood Academic, New York.
6. Glaser W. A. Pretrial Discovery and the Adversary System. 1968;Sage, New York.
7. Matthews S., Postlewaite A. Quality Testing and Disclosure. RAND J. Econ. 16:1985;328-340.
8. Okuno-Fujiwara M., Postlewaite A., Suzumura K. Strategic Information Revelation. Rev. Econ. Stud. 57:1990;25-47.
9. Shavell S. Sharing of Information prior to Settlement Negotiations. RAND J. Econ. 20:1989;183-195.
10. Schelling T. C. The Strategy of Conflict. 1960;Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge.
11. Sobel J. An Analysis of Discovery Rules. Law Contemp. Problems. 52:1989;133-159.
12. Spence A. M. Efficient Collusion and Reaction Functions. Canad. J. Econ. 11:1978;527-533.
13. Wilson R. Design of Efficient Trading Procedures. Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Proceedings. The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence. XIV:1993;Addison-Wesley, Reading. p. 125-152.