Contract damages and cooperative investments

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 84-105

  Che, Yeon Koo ^a   Chung, Tai Yeong ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033426458     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2556047     Document Type: Article

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