The level of litigation: Private versus social optimality of suit and of settlement

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 99-115

  Shavell, Steven ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033095394     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00026-X     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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3. Brown, J. (1973). "Toward an economic theory of liability." Journal of Legal Studies 2:323-350.
4. Cooter, R., and D. Rubinfeld. (1989). "Economic analysis of legal disputes and their resolution." Journal of Economic Literature 27:1067-1097.
5. Dewees, D., D. Duff, and M. Trebilcock. (1996). Exploring the Domain of Accident Law, New York: Oxford University Press.
6. Hylton, K. (1990). "The influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence." International Review of Law and Economics 10:161-171.
7. Kaplow, L. (1986). "Private versus social costs in bringing suit." Journal of Legal Studies 15:371-386.
8. Kaplow, L., and S. Shavell. (1996). "Accuracy in the assessment of damages." Journal of Law and Economics 39:191-210.
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10. Menell, P. (1983). "A note on private versus social incentives to sue in a costly legal system." Journal of Legal Studies 12:41-52.
11. Polinsky, A., and Y.-K. Che. (1991). "Decoupling liability: Optimal incentives for care and litigation." Rand Journal of Economics 22:562-570.
12. Polinsky, A., and D. Rubinfeld. (1988a). "The welfare implications of costly litigation for the level of liability." Journal of Legal Studies 17:151-164.
13. Polinsky, A., and D. Rubinfeld. (1988b). "The deterrent effects of settlements and trials." International Review of Law and Economics 8:109-116.
14. Rose-Ackerman, S., and M. Geistfeld. (1987). "The divergence between social and private incentives to sue: A comment on shavell, menell, and kaplow." Journal of Legal Studies 16:483-491.
15. Shavell, S. (1982). "The social versus the private incentive to bring suit in a costly legal system." Journal of Legal Studies 11:333-340.
16. Shavell, S. (1987). Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
17. Shavell, S. (1996). "The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality." Discussion paper No. 184, Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
18. Shavell, S. (1997). "The fundamental divergence between the private and the social incentive to use the legal system." Journal of Legal Studies 26:575-612.
19. Spier, K. (1994). "Settlement bargaining and the design of damage awards." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 10:84-95.
20. Spier, K. (1997). "A note on the divergence between the private and the social motive to settle under a negligence rule." Journal of Legal Studies 26:613-622.