The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use

American Economic Review

Volumn 86, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 766-788

  Sethi, Rajiv ^a   Somanathan, E ^b  

^a Barnard College of Columbia University   (United States)

^b EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR; GAME THEORY; PROPERTY RIGHTS; RESOURCES USE; SOCIAL NORMS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0030319313     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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