Cadillac contracts and up-front payments: Efficient investment under expectation damages

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 98-118

  Edlin, Aaron S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030532796     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023363     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey. 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," 64 Econometrica 257-82.
2. Chung, Tai-Yeong. 1991. "Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing," 58 Review of Economic Studies 1031-42.
3. _. 1995. "Commitment Through Specific Investment in Contractual Relationships," mimeo, University of Western Ontario.
4. Cooter, Robert, and Melvin A. Eisenberg. 1985. "Damages for Breach of Contract," 73 California Law Review 1432-89.
5. Edlin, Aaron S. 1993. "Specific Investments, Holdups, and Efficient Contract Remedies," Chap. 1 of "Aspects of the Efficient Recovery of Fixed Costs: A Collection of Essays," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University.
6. _, and Stefan Reichelstein. 1995. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment." Forthcoming in American Economic Review in June, 1996.
7. _, and Chris Shannon. 1995. "Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics," Working Paper No. 95-238, Institute for Business and Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley.
8. Fuller, Lon L., and Melvin A. Eisenberg. 1990. Basic Contract Law. St. Paul, Minn.: West.
9. Hart, Oliver D., and John D. Moore. 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," 56 Econometrica 755-85.
10. Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael L. Katz. 1993. "Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and their Breach," 9 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 230-55.
11. Polinsky, A. Mitchell. 1989. An Introduction to Law and Economics. Boston: Little, Brown.
12. Rogerson, William P. 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measure for Breach of Contract," 15 RAND Journal of Economics 39-53.
13. _. 1992. Contractual Solutions to the Holdup Problem,59 Review of Economic Studies 777-94.
14. Shavell, Steven. 1980. "Damage Measure for Breach of Contract," 11 Bell Journal of Economics 466-90.
15. Schwartz, Alan. 1993. "The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law," 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 389-419.
16. Spier, Kathryn E., and Michael D. Whinston. 1995. "On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation," 46 RAND Journal of Economics 180-202.
17. Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.
18. _. 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," 73 American Economic Review 519-40.