Casual police corruption and the economics of crime

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 75-87

  Bowles, Roger ^a   Garoupa, Nuno ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031097131     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00056-7     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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