In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 397-416

  Kobayashi, Bruce H ^a   Lott Jr , John R ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030529070     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00034-8     Document Type: Article

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