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Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 29-67

Game theoretic research on the design of international environmental agreements: Insights, critical remarks, and future challenges

Author keywords

Agenda for future research; Critical review; Game theoretic research; International environmental agreements; Recent results

Indexed keywords


EID: 62349125267     PISSN: 19321465     EISSN: 19321473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1561/101.00000011     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (147)

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