The impact of equity-preferences on the stability of international environmental agreements

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 247-267

  Lange, Andreas ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH ZEW   (Germany)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Equity preference; Inequality aversion; International environmental negotiations; Per capita emission levels

Indexed keywords

CLIMATE CHANGE; COMMERCE; DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; FINANCE; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

COALITION FORMATION; EQUITY PREFERENCE; INEQUALITY AVERSION; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS; PER CAPITA EMISSION LEVELS;

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION;

CLIMATE CHANGE; DEVELOPING WORLD; ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT;

EID: 33744962203     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-005-0006-4     Document Type: Article

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