Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 68-79

  Kolstad, Charles D ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE   (United States)

Author keywords

Climate change; International environmental agreements; Learning; Treaties; Uncertainty; Voluntary provision of public goods

Indexed keywords

CLIMATE CHANGE; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; PROBLEM SOLVING;

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; SYSTEMATIC UNCERTAINTY; VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS;

CONTRACTS;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; LEARNING; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

EID: 33845922925     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2006.08.001     Document Type: Article

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