The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 379-401

  Chander, Parkash ^a   Tulkens, Henry ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040653942     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01263279     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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